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Abstract Does non-human great ape communication
have meaning in the same way as human words (and some
other human behaviours)? I recently argued that the answer
to this question is most likely to be in the negative (Scott-
Phillips in Anim Cogn 18(3):801–805, 2015a). Here, I (1)
briefly respond to criticism of this view; (2) describe
exactly what sort of empirical study could settle the matter;
and (3) discuss what the best working hypotheses should
be, in the absence of definitive empirical studies.
Keywords Communication  Meaning  Intentionality 
Language  Primates  Pragmatics
Introduction
The question of meaning in non-human primate communi-
cation is important both for our understanding of ape minds
in their own right, and for understanding the evolutionary
origins of human communication (recent important contri-
butions include Millikan 2004; Hurford 2007; Tomasello
2008; Rendall et al. 2009; Wharton 2009; Wheeler and Fis-
cher 2012; Bar-On 2013; Stegmann 2013; Hobaiter and
Byrne 2014; Scott-Phillips 2014). Adding to this literature, I
recently published a short paper, in this journal, that descri-
bed two different ways in which the term meaning can
coherently be used in the context of communication, but only
one of which corresponds to the way in which human words,
and some other communicative acts, have meaning (Scott-
Phillips 2015a). I also described what would need to be
shown experimentally in order to conclude that a given
behaviour is meaningful in this way. I argued that no case of
non-human communication has yet been shown to satisfy this
criterion, and hence concluded that there is at present no
justified reason to assign meaning to the communication of
non-human great apes, or any other non-human species. In a
counter-article, also in this journal, Moore argues for the very
opposite conclusion, namely that there are ample grounds to
believe that great ape communication has meaning in the
relevant sense of the term (Moore 2015). Here, I respond
briefly to Moore’s arguments.
Let me begin my stressing one very important point of
agreement. Give or take some matters of detail, there is
consensus between Moore and myself, and indeed in much
of the wider literature, that meaning involves overt inten-
tionality, in which speakers produce signals with an
intention that receivers recognise that the signaller has such
an intention. I expand on this point in the next sec-
tion. Debate begins not here, but with the subsequent
question of how overt intentionality can and should be
operationalised. Moore calls these ‘‘interpretational dis-
putes’’ (p. 1). Expanding on points made in my previous
paper, I here (1) describe exactly what experimental
developments would advance discussion in the future, and
(2) set out the options for what the best working hypotheses
should be, based on our current state of knowledge.
Meaning and overt intentionality
The vast majority of contemporary discussion of the notion
of meaning has at its foundations the analysis of Paul Grice
(1957; see also Grice 1969). Grice’s work has been adapted
& Thomas C. Scott-Phillips
t.c.scott-phillips@durham.ac.uk
1 Evolutionary Anthropology Research Group, Department of
Anthropology, Durham University, Dawson Building, South
Road, Durham DH1 3LE, UK
123
Anim Cogn (2016) 19:233–238
DOI 10.1007/s10071-015-0936-3
and built on in various ways since, in order to address a
variety of concerns raised against it (Schiffer 1972; Neale
1992; Sperber and Wilson 1995; Recanati 2004). However,
the Gricean insight that is most important for the present
purposes is also the one that is most widely accepted. It is
correspondingly retained, in one form or another, in most
subsequent work. It is typically expressed as a pair of
conditional clauses:
A speaker (or gesturer) S means something by an
utterance x if and only if, for some hearer (or audi-
ence) H, S utters x intending: (1) H to produce a
particular response r; and (2) H to recognise that
S intends (1).
Clause 2 states that the speaker intends that the hearer
recognises that the speaker has an intention to inform the
hearer. Another way to express this point is to say that the
speaker’s utterance must be not only intentional (this is
clause 1), but overtly intentional (clause 2). The function of
this second clause is to exclude behaviours that are inten-
ded to produce a particular response, but which are not
meaningful. In the previous article I illustrated this dis-
tinction with the following contrast (derived and adapted
from Grice 1989; Wharton 2009):
(a) Mary intends that her mother sees that she is unwell.
Mary thus greets her mother with an exaggeratedly
sad face, and overtly points to her forehead, which is
pale.
(b) Mary intends that her mother sees that she is unwell.
However, she doesn’t want this intention to be
noticed (it might decrease her chances of getting a
day off school). So Mary pretends to be asleep, but
ensures that her pale forehead is fully visible.
Only (a) is overtly intentional. Hence, it is only (a) that
can have meaning. Overt intentionality is not all that there
is to meaning, but it is the heart of the matter (see citations
above). Moore agrees: ‘‘this distinction [between (a) and
(b)] captures Grice’s aims well’’ (in press, p. 3).
It is worth stating explicitly that, in this discussion to
date, overt intentionality has effectively been used syn-
onymously with the term ostension. For instance, my
article was concerned exclusively with overt intentionality,
but Moore interprets it in terms of ostension [‘‘(Scott-
Phillips’) argument turns on a distinction between gestures
that are produced intentionally and gestures that are pro-
duced both ostensively and intentionally’’ (in press, p. 1)]. I
will in this article continue to use the term overt inten-
tionality, for two reasons. First, the label overt intention-
ality brings attention to the fact that plain intentionality—
much studied in the animal communication literature—is
insufficient for meaning. Overtness is necessary also.
Second, the term ostension is not theory-neutral. As a piece
of theoretical terminology, ostension was first used in
Relevance: Communication & Cognition (Sperber and
Wilson 1995) and continues to be closely associated with
Relevance Theory. Still, Relevance Theory is only one of
several theoretical approaches to linguistic pragmatics, and
for the purposes of a short article I wanted to abstract away
from those debates. Overt intentionality captures what is
important about ostension and meaning, while remaining
largely theory-neutral.
How should we operationalise overt intentionality?
As mentioned above, there is agreement that evidence of a
command over the difference between overt and covert
intentionality would be good evidence of meaning in the
relevant sense [i.e. (a) vs (b) in the example above]. Dis-
agreement begins with the question of how this distinction
could be experimentally demonstrated.
In my previous article, I suggested that experimental
demonstration that individuals can differentially use overt
and covert intentionality in appropriate contexts would be
sufficient evidence for meaning. Above, Mary’s actions are
overt in (a), covert in (b), and hence express her intentions
in overt and covert ways. There is, to my knowledge, only
one existing study of this sort, conducted on human chil-
dren (Grosse et al. 2013). Three- and 5-year-olds played
with an adult and in the course of doing so found them-
selves in a position where they had both a reason to help
the adult, and the knowledge to do so. In the experimental
condition they were also aware that the adult did not want
to be helped. A control condition included no such
restriction. In short, the children had a desire to inform the
adult, but whether it would be appropriate to express this
overtly (i.e. by normal means of Gricean communication)
or covertly varied across conditions. In both age groups the
children behaved according to condition: those in the
control condition expressed their intentions overtly, but
those in the experimental condition often did so covertly
(Grosse et al. 2013). This type of covert behaviour is
typically called hidden authorship.
Since they make extensive use of verbal interaction,
these same methods cannot be used for non-human apes, or
even for pre-linguistic children. These methods also rely
upon children’s natural disposition to help others, which is
not shared by other apes. As such, it is unlikely that these
particular methods could be adapted for use with non-hu-
man great apes or pre-linguistic children. A new experi-
mental protocol will have to be developed. Still, although
there are serious methodological challenges here, it
remains the case that the best, clearest evidence of overt
intentionality is the ability to distinguish it from other
forms of intentional expression, such as covert
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intentionality (see above). Nowhere does Moore dispute
that success at such tests would provide compelling evi-
dence of Gricean meaning. I assume this to be a point of
agreement.
Moore does, however, offer some alternative sugges-
tions about what might also constitute sufficient evidence
for Gricean meaning. He focuses in particular on eye
contact, which humans often use to express overt inten-
tionality (this is not the only way in which they do so, of
course). Moore points to several studies which manipulate
whether or not eye contact is used in this way, and test
whether participants (typically human children) behave
accordingly. If participants are able to competently
recognise Gricean communication for what it is, then they
should interpret an individual’s behaviour as communica-
tive only when overt intentionality is expressed. Several
studies now show that human children of various ages are
able to do this (e.g. Tomasello et al. 1997; Behne et al.
2005; Gra¨fenhain et al. 2009; Moore et al. 2013). Based on
the success and general acceptance of this approach, Moore
then suggests that eye contact can be used as diagnostic of
the expression of overt intentionality. He further points out
that eye contact often precedes ape gestural communication
and hence concludes that there are sufficient grounds to
assign meaning to this type of communication.
Here we reach a critical point. In the studies cited above,
and others like them, eye contact is used to express overt
intentionality. This does not mean, however, that the use of
eye contact logically implies that overt intentionality is
being expressed. It is quite possible to express overt
intentionality without eye contact, and also for eye contact
to occur without any overt intentionality. In fact, eye
contact without overt intentionality is an entirely quotidian
occurrence. It happens, in particular, if I simply want to
check whether somebody is looking at me. For instance,
when I am crossing the road, I sometimes make eye contact
with a car driver, but do not express overt intentionality
when I do so, at least not as a matter of course. In short, just
because eye contact can be used to express overt inten-
tionality, that does not mean that it always or necessarily
does so. In short, eye contact is neither necessary nor
sufficient evidence for overt intentionality. Moore is cor-
rect that there is ‘‘overwhelming’’ evidence for eye contact
in chimpanzee communication, but this does not, in and of
itself, imply meaning. There is overwhelming evidence
that pedestrians use eye contact when they cross the road,
but that does not mean that they express meaning when
they do so.
The same points apply, mutatis mutandis, to infant
communication, and also to other potential markers of
overt intentionality, such as pointing. Just as the use of eye
contact is not conclusive evidence of overt intentionality in
any non-human species, neither is it in humans. Nor is
pointing conclusive evidence either. Pointing, eye gaze,
and some other behaviours can be and are used to express
overt intentionality, and as such observation of such
behaviour can thus be relevant to the discussion. A sys-
tematic and exhaustive comparison of expressive beha-
viour in infants and chimpanzees would be especially
informative. But whatever such research might reveal, it
will remain the case that eye gaze, pointing, and related
behaviours are, formally, neither necessary nor sufficient
for meaning.
The bottom line is this. To properly test for the
expression of overt intentionality (and hence for meaning),
then the key experimental tests are those in which overt
intentionality is behaviourally distinguished from other
means of intentional expression (such as covert intention-
ality), and where experimental manipulations predict which
type of intentional expression should be employed. (To
repeat: I believe that Moore would agree with this.) This is
just as with any other cognitive process: we must beha-
viourally distinguish the process from other closely related
behaviours and experimentally show that these different
behaviours are performed exactly when we expect the
different cognitive processes to be employed. With regard
to overt intentionality, there is one such experiment on
human infants (3- and 5-year-olds; Grosse et al. 2013), and
none for any non-human animal, or any pre-verbal human
infants. Moore’s arguments do not change these facts.
What is the most appropriate working hypothesis?
Given that the key experiments for meaning in non-human
animals have not been conducted, we cannot know for sure
whether any non-human communication system has
meaning, in the Gricean sense of the term. Ditto for pre-
linguistic infants. This raises the question of what the right
working hypotheses should be. In absence of definitive
experimental results, we can therefore only (and arguably
should) ask what is most likely to be true, based on present
circumstantial data, and be willing to reassess as and when
more conclusive data comes in. In short, we should be
Bayesian about our working hypotheses. It may, moreover,
be the case that the correct working hypothesis is different
for children than for, say, chimpanzees (or any other non-
human species). In this section I will suggest that this is
indeed the case. Specifically, I will suggest that the cir-
cumstantial data are different for the two different groups,
and therefore that we should assign different prior proba-
bilities to the claims that (1) pre-linguistic infants com-
municate with Gricean meaning, and (2) non-human
primates communicate with Gricean meaning. These prior
probabilities can and indeed should change as further data
comes in, but based on our present knowledge we should
Anim Cogn (2016) 19:233–238 235
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be more willing to believe that pre-linguistic infants are
Gricean communicators, than to believe that non-human
primates are.
In the case of pre-linguistic infants, it is highly relevant
that they will in time develop into fully competent users of
overtly intentional communication. Furthermore, newly
linguistic children have been experimentally shown to have
command of the distinction between overt and covert
intentionality, and also of other important aspects of Gri-
cean communication, in particular an intention to change
mental states (rather than just behaviour) (Grosse et al.
2010, 2013; see also Tomasello 2008, for a review). Thus,
to sustain a hypothesis that pre-linguistic infants are not
Gricean communicators, we would be obliged to provide
(1) an explanation of their pre-linguistic communication
that is not Gricean, and (2) an account of how they tran-
sition from this non-Gricean state into a Gricean one. This
may be possible, but the task is certainly not a trivial one.
As such, the theoretical choice here is, roughly, between
the following two views:
(1a) that pre-linguistic infants are likely to be Gricean
communicators from the beginning, and that what
develops over time is their competence in this
domain; or
(1b) that pre-linguistic infants are not likely to be Gricean
communicators, and hence that what develops over
time is Gricean communication itself.
Both views are defensible, but there is no particular
reason to assign them the same prior probability. As with
all academic debates, there may be good reasons to believe
that, absent definitive evidence, one view is, on balance,
more likely to be true than the other.
With non-human primates the situation is at least
somewhat different. Whereas experiments have shown that
older children are competent Gricean communicators, there
is no experimental demonstration of the same in non-hu-
man primates. In particular, there is no experimental evi-
dence that non-human primates of any age or any degree of
enculturation have command of the distinction between
overt and covert intentionality, or that they have any
intentions to affect mental states rather than behaviour. I
am not arguing that such evidence will never be produced:
maybe it will, maybe it won’t. What I am saying is that
such evidence does not presently exist. We can explain this
fact in (again speaking just roughly) one of two ways. Non-
human primates have not been shown to demonstrate overt
intentionality either:
(2a) because non-human great apes most likely are
Gricean communicators, but experimentalists have
not yet been able to meet the significant method-
ological challenges required to demonstrate this; or
(2b) because non-human primates are unlikely to be
Gricean communicators.
Again, both views are defensible. Also as before, there
is no particular reason to assign them the same prior
probability. One or the other of these views may deserve a
higher prior probability.
Note that the entailments of (1a) (that human infants are
likely to be Gricean communicators) are not the same,
mutadis mutandis, as the entailments of (2a) (that at least
some non-human great apes are likely to be Gricean
communicators). For instance, justification of (2a) requires
some explanation of, among other things, the relative
dearth of pointing in the wild. By raising the issue of
pointing in the wild, I am not attempting to argue for one
view or another. Rather, I am simply pointing out that this
is a pertinent question (one of several), if we make a
provisional acceptance of (2a). I am also pointing out that
the list of pertinent questions for (2a) is not the same as
those for (1a). Nor are the entailments of (1b) the same as
those of (2b). Some key questions for each of the four
views are listed in Table 1.
As such, there is no a priori reason that our choice
between (1a) and (1b) should be equivalent to our choice
between (2a) and (2b). Put another way, if we choose, say,
(1a) over (1b), that does not mean that we should neces-
sarily accept (2a) over (2b). The two choices to be made
here are not the same as each other and each should be
assessed on its own balance of probabilities. It would in
particular not be anthropomorphic (at least not necessarily
so) to accept (1a) over (1b), but (2b) over (2a). Indeed, my
own reading of the present literature is, yes, that (1a)
should be preferred over (1b), and that (2b) should be
preferred over (2a). I have discussed my reasons for this
belief elsewhere, and so will not regurgitate them here (see
Scott-Phillips 2014, 2015a, b). Still, absent definitive
experimental evidence (for discussion of which see above),
individual researchers can form their own views about the
balance of prior probabilities here.
Conclusion
Questions about whether non-human primate and pre-lin-
guistic human infants are Gricean communicators are
presently matters of judgement, but the issues are in the
end empirical matters. There are, moreover, key experi-
mental tests that can be conducted, specifically experi-
ments in which overt intentionality is behaviourally
distinguished from other means of intentional expression,
and where experimental manipulations predict which type
of intentional expression should be employed. Only when
such experiments are conducted will we be able to settle
236 Anim Cogn (2016) 19:233–238
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the matter. In the meantime, our claims can only be pro-
visional. I have argued previously that the best provisional
view for non-human primate communication is that it is
most likely not meaningful in the same way that human
words are, and Moore’s arguments (in particular regarding
eye contact) do not persuade me to change this view.
Regardless, let me finish by thanking Moore for his com-
ments. Even though I disagree with the content of his
arguments, I do believe that they make a worthwhile
contribution to discussion. They have in particular forced
me to sharpen my own views and arguments, and for this I
am especially grateful.
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